Misdiagnosis:
Dysfunction between western health
organizations and developing nations
Infectious diseases play a unique role in perpetuating state weakness, as well as creating security threats
for other nations. Indonesia makes a remarkable case
study for the examination of the role of infectious diseases in middle states with weak institutions. The country found itself in the middle of a global controversy
regarding the novel Southeast Asian highly pathogenic
influenza A (HPAI H5N1) virus in 2007. At that time,
the virus just described was emerging in Southeast Asia.
An avian influenza virus, it had made the interspecies
jump to human infectivity, but not yet to sustained human-to-human transmission. Because it was found to be
highly pathogenic, with significant associated morbidity
and mortality within Indonesia, concerns were high regarding the potential of a pandemic. However, despite
initial cooperation with the World Health Organization
(WHO) regarding pandemic preparedness, Indonesia
abruptly altered course and withheld virus samples from
WHO labs, igniting a global firestorm as epidemiologists
were concerned the Indonesian virus in particular could
lead to a pandemic.
This article will explore how Indonesia withheld virus
samples because of an underlying distrust of Western
institutions. This relationship resulted from serial negative encounters with Western institutions, beginning
in the 1600’s with the highly extractive Dutch East India
Company and continuing until as recently as 1997 with
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank
(WB) during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998.
Two Indonesias
Although Indonesia is considered a relatively strong
state by the Index of State Weakness, (ranking 77 out of
141 in 2008) and by the current health of its economy, it’s
World Bank and United Nations Development Program
(UNDP) health care indicators are on par with other lower-middle income developing nations. In fact, the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID)
Strategy for Indonesia 2014-2018 describes “Two Indo-

nesias.” It outlines the growing income inequality in Indonesia, with the richest twenty percent of the population owning eighty percent of the wealth, and half of the
population living on less than two dollars a day.
Indonesia was particularly hard-hit by the avian Influenza A H5N1 pandemic. According the WHO’s Disease
Outbreak News in January 2014, Indonesia experienced
a total of 195 documented infections, with 163 deaths.
A British Medical Journal (BMJ) Public Health article
in 2013 noted at that time the case fatality rate was 83%,
almost twenty percent higher than similarly affected
countries. Worldwide documented cases from the start
of the outbreak through January 2014 totaled 650 with
386 deaths. The hardest hit countries were Indonesia
(numbers stated above), Egypt (173 cases, 63 deaths),
Vietnam (125 cases, 62 deaths), and China (45 cases, 30
deaths).
Because of its status as a developing nation with relatively weak public health institutions, public health
threats such as avian influenza H5N1, emerging from
Indonesia could potentially be associated with an ineffective response. Shortcomings in Indonesia’s institutions play a major role in the dangers of emerging infectious diseases. These include corruption in political
institutions, health care system inequities that favor the
rich, public health deficiencies both in veterinary and
human health, and cultural distrust of Western institutions such as the WHO, the World Bank, and the IMF.
This distrust played out during the H5N1 outbreak. In
an unprecedented move, Indonesia withheld their viral
samples from the WHO’s Global Influenza Surveillance
Network (GISN), claiming ecologic sovereignty over
the virus type due to a distrust of Western institutions.
Biopiracy and Neo-Colonialism
While Indonesia did eventually decide to share viral samples with the GISN, their distrust was validated when an Australian vaccine manufacturer (who
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had obtained samples of the Indonesian virus from the
WHO) approached the Indonesian government offering
to sell the vaccine. Indonesia felt that this was another
example of western powerstrying to keep developing nations hostage. An intense legal battle gave rise to a new
term in global governance, “biopiracy.” Indonesia’s fear
was that a vaccine was being developed using their H5N1
samples by the Australian company, who would then attempt to sell it targeting their strain of H5N1 at unaffordable prices during a national emergency (such as an
epidemic). Unavailability of the vaccine in Indonesia led
to a perception that they were living in a “sacrifice zone”,
in which the Indonesian population was being ignored
at the expense of protecting wealthy nations. Indonesia
felt this amounted to blackmail and was representative
of western international regimes holding
economic power over
developing nations.
This added insult to
injury as the country was also dealing
with the highest caseload of human-avian
flu at that time. Furthermore, Indonesia’s
Health Minister had
difficulty
obtaining
oseltamir, the only
known effective treat- Jakarta, Indonesia
ment for influenza A,
because worldwide stockpiles were unavailable due to
alleged hoarding of the drug by wealthy nations. These
events led Indonesia to reconsider what they were gaining from participating in the global health surveillance
system. Indonesia’s Health Ministry decided once again
to stop sharing virus samples, claiming that the use of
their virus to patent a vaccine to which they did not have
access violated the principle of ecologic sovereignty. This
placed the country in violation of both Indonesia’s Material Transport Agreement (MTA) and local regulations.
Western institutions, including the WHO, the CDC, and
the ECDC explained discrepancies in vaccine availability
in several ways. The first was on the basis of epidemiologic factors. Targets for vaccine coverage are those peo-

ple who meet eligibility criteria for high risk, including
the elderly, and those with chronic medical conditions.
Western countries argued that they receive higher coverage with vaccination stockpiles because they have the
largest populations meeting those criteria. They added
that many of these same countries have pharmaceutical
presence able to produce the vaccines locally. They further asserted that the effects of seasonal influenza outbreaks are not well-studied in developing nations, thus
there is not a documented need for seasonal flu vaccine
in those countries. Finally, they insisted that withholding virus samples was in violation of international law,
specifically an International Health Regulation signed
at the World Health Assembly in 2005 (IHR 2005). As
far as the vaccine manufacturer was concerned, the
WHO insisted that
issue was between
the Indonesian government and the vaccine manufacturer.
In the end, Indonesia
successfully claimed
that IHR 2005 was
not binding until
it officially entered
force on June 15,
2007, which was after the controversy
started and the samples were held. Furthermore, they argued that while the regulation was
designed to facilitate sharing information, it did not
include biologic samples. Thus, even though the IHR
was not officially in effect, they still had not violated the
voluntary obligation expressed in the law.
However, the larger question remains. How can a global
response to a pandemic that could potentially require
up to six billion vaccine doses be possible? Less-developed countries, especially those with infant scientific
or pharmaceutical industries, are ill-equipped to develop and distribute influenza vaccines on an emergency
basis. Furthermore, some countries, as is the case with
Indonesia, do not trust western institutions to meet
their needs in cases of wider global epidemics. In fact,
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Know Your Enemy:

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A (HPAI H5N1)
each clade, some clades may be more
pathogenic in humans versus others,
resulting in more profound morbidity
and/or higher mortality.
This information is critical to pandemic preparedness and vaccine development because vaccines must be
tailored to the clade with the highest
pathogenicity. Furthermore, some
clades may have a higher antigenicity
(the ability to induce antibodies) and
therefore make more effective vaccine
preparations. Researchers and manufacturers need access to as many clades
as possible to design a vaccine that
effectively both produces antibodies
with the fewest doses possible (ideally
only a single thermo-stable dose) and
targets the most pathogenic clade(s).
H5N1 is a subtype of avian influenza A that has crossed
species to infect not only birds, but also humans. It is a
type of virus known collectively as a “zoonoses”- any organism (virus, bacteria, parasites et cetera) whose known
hosts are non-human vertebrates. Close and sustained
contact between people and the usual host organism,
birds, can result in infection in humans. Molecular identification of the viral genome in the case of H5N1 was
found to have originated in wild fowl in China where it
infected domesticated chickens. Subtypes of this virus
were eventually proven to be identical between infected humans and poultry in the case of multiple countries
across Eurasia, including Vietnam and Indonesia, proving it had crossed species.
Differences between virus families are known as “clades”.
In the case of H5N1, several clades were identified and
mapped, allowing epidemiologists to track the spread of
particular viral families (such as those descending into
Vietnam and Thailand, versus those found in Indonesia). Because of peculiarities to the genetic code held in

The international health regime has evolved over time to
include free and prompt sharing of new viruses to international health agencies in order to study and develop
vaccines as needed pre-emptively. The primary agencies
are: the WHO, which is associated with the United Nations; the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) in the United States; and the European Centre
for Disease for Prevention and Control (ECDC). These
agencies work in conjunction with the Global Influenza
Surveillance Network (GISN) to survey for and genetically categorize novel influenza viruses. The goal is to
identify potentially epidemic strains at their source and
activate the so-called “Rapid Containment Strategy” to
keep the virus from spreading outside its zone of origin.
These agencies are especially concerned about influenza viruses because they have known pandemic ability,
as evidenced by Spanish Influenza that resulted in more
than thirty million deaths worldwide. But the entire regime hinges on rapid typing of novel strains, which can
only be accomplished though timely participation in the
GISN, so the containment strategy can be activated.
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in 2010, a review of seasonal vaccine (H1N1) availability by Khoon showed these worries to be valid. Despite
the global vaccine manufacturer’s promise to provide
poor nations with a stockpile of 120 million doses,
those pledges could not be fulfilled until months after
the pandemic had waned. Meanwhile, wealthy nations
who had been able to pre-order doses were provided
with the first billion produced. Thus, Indonesia (and
other developing nations) perceive themselves to be in
a precarious and dangerous situation, providing the viruses that may herald a coming pandemic, yet unable to
obtain vaccinations until too late. However, as Margaret
Chan, Director General of the WHO argues, the global
community is at risk when global cooperation in surveillance and planning is not achieved.

should include transparency in policy and processes.
3. View these opportunities as chances for further institutional and economic development. Offer training to local health care personnel in both veterinary and human
medical disease surveillance and intervention. Avoid
creating parallel systems by not allowing foreign actors
(NGO’s etc.) to solely perform these duties. Instead, work
with existing infrastructure and governments to build
institutions locally and prevent brain drain by creating
employment opportunities in the home country.
4. Make an effort to understand local cultural and historical context so solutions will be as seamless as possible.
Be sensitive to these contexts in an effort to avoid paternalistic tendencieswhile seeking consensus regarding
global issues.

Policy Solutions
There are several policy options that can assist international cooperation between developing countries, like
Indonesia, as well as promote increased cooperation
between global institutions, such as the WHO, and the
nations they claim to help.

Conclusion
Infectious diseases are increasingly recognized as threats
to national security. Indonesia is a contemporary and
compelling study of the multiple and sometimes disparate relationships between public health and geopolitical interests. First, Indonesia displays the cultural norms
that allow close proximity and spread of the avian influenza virus to human populations as well as the weak and
underfunded health care infrastructure that is unable to
care for the ill and infected. Second, it is a nation bearing
the collective memory of a long-lasting colonial occupation, and perceives that her national sovereignty continues to be undermined at the hands of global governance
agencies. Global institutions such as the World Bank and
WHO either intentionally or unwittingly hindered efforts at full integration of Indonesia into global economic
and governance regimes. Third, Indonesia’s demographic
challenges as the fourth most populous nation, strategically located in the heart of global shipping lanes, placed
an enormous strain on her governance structures during
an effort to treat an epidemic within her borders and to
inhibit the epidemic’s spread to other regions. Finally, all
of the above factors support the case that both national
security and public health threats are culture specific. A
case-specific paradigm must be developed so that all of
these issues can be addressed to acheive a desirable outcome.

1. Continue dialogue, including listening to complaints
from developing countries regarding global governance
and sincerely attempt to remedy those complaints. The
WHO did this in their pandemic preparedness plan by
having multiple meetings with all the stakeholders, but
in the future this should be accomplished successfully
in less than four years.
2. Involve countries in all steps of pandemic preparedness so they can have ownership over the process, including assurances that vaccine and/or treatment will
be available within an acceptable time frame. This
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